The decline of Hungarian authoritarianism

Although the Eurobarometer shows that European society still rests on a majority support of more than half of citizens, it is worth questioning how this is reflected symptomatically when parties classified as extremist by intelligence reports, as is the case with Alternative for Germany, are constantly growing; an exemplary case that denotes that we are facing the acceptance of illiberal alternatives with regard to politics.

It is necessary to understand, therefore, that this regulatory framework, typical of a rule of law, was not permanent. The Hungarian case demonstrates this: the rise of political forces that adopted illiberal and populist rhetoric reflected a setback during the last years of government. As if it were a prophecy, this refers us to Popper's dilemma in The open society and its enemies: the danger of tolerating those who do not share the pluralist framework.

The Parliament building on the Danube. Built between 1885 and 1904, it is one of the most visible institutional symbols of the Hungarian republic.

This occurred as if it were a European anomaly during the last sixteen years in Hungary, a country that, after a crisis of the traditional parties, witnessed the triumph of an outsider candidate who promised changes: Viktor Orbán, who achieved his goal by subverting the constitutional order, then giving rise to a clear regression of republican institutions and, consequently, undermining that division of powers typical of any democratic republican principle.

Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary between 1998-2002 and 2010-2025. His illiberal rhetoric and control over institutions became the reference model for other authoritarian movements in Europe.

That principle, which was inspired by Montesquieu and the need for a system of checks and balances, was eroded in this case by a government that did not understand elementary issues linked to the independence of the judiciary. His most explicit attack was the creation, by law, of courts directly controlled by the Executive. How would it be possible, then, to limit a power whose ambition seemed excessive, in a situation where also the last reservation not controlled by the ruling party was gradually losing its independence?

In line with this, Timothy Snyder warns us in his work On Tyranny about the dangers posed by the rise of authoritarian leaders and the role of citizens in the face of a kind of civic responsibility for our democratic exercise. Likewise, it reminds us of the importance of the role of intermediate actors in democratic participation and how critical thinking can be essential for the survival of freedoms.

But what margin did these intermediate actors have in the Orbán era? As if it were an Orwellian nightmare, the Fidesz party government controlled most of the Hungarian media apparatus, while at the state level it did nothing more than reproduce an official narrative. Here it is worth remembering, as Reporters Without Borders denounced, the mode of operation of businessmen linked to the government oligarchic circle, who through various acquisitions guaranteed and shielded the party apparatus with control of approximately 80% of the resources of media power.

Likewise, non-governmental organizations and the independent press that barely maintained a presence in the country saw their scope of action progressively restricted under initiatives such as the bill on "transparency in public life", which allowed those organizations that received foreign financing to be identified as a threat to Hungarian sovereignty. In this way, they were exposed to extreme bureaucratic controls, possible sanctions, financial restrictions and mechanisms capable of making their operation unviable. This clearly contributed to the consolidation of an official narrative in broad sectors of the Hungarian population, by systematically reducing the spaces for pluralism and criticism.

Hence, it was no coincidence that the official defeat was only possible when the opposition managed to articulate an effective strategy of political coordination and public communication. There, young people played a leading role, both due to the importance of social networks and the territorial and in-person work to reach disenchanted sectors that were decisive in increasing electoral mobilization.

Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). His warnings about the banality of evil and the way in which parties can displace and empty institutions retain, in this case, a disturbing validity.

It is in that same context of concentration of power, shrinking of public debate and weakening of dissident voices that allows us to understand the validity of Hannah Arendt's warnings. His reflection on the banality of evil refers to the risk of a citizenry that, due to obedience or lack of critical awareness, ends up naturalizing the deterioration of its own freedoms. But, in addition, in The origins of totalitarianism, Arendt comments on another decisive danger: that which arises when the party begins to displace institutions, emptying them of autonomy and subordinating them to a factional logic of power.

This situation allows us to understand that the problem does not reside only in who concentrates power, but also in the conversion of the state apparatus into an instrument of partisan coercion and in social passivity in the face of this process, in a dynamic that refers to what the author described as the mass man, nurtured in a situation of official manipulation.

It is along these same lines that Daniel Muchnik anticipates the resurgence of populism and new right-wing movements whose rhetoric bears disturbing similarities with discourses that we believed were outdated and typical of a nationalism with vestiges of an authoritarian past. This is a particularly visible phenomenon in Europe and the region, and Orbán was for a long time a reference for different partners and illiberal forces on the continent.

The signs of institutional erosion were evident: censored press, restricted NGOs and even banned books and closed universities. Events that, without a doubt, once again put into effect the warnings issued by the aforementioned authors. It is also worth remembering how the majority mechanisms granted it almost absolute representation and allowed it to consolidate a scheme increasingly distant from democratic pluralism for almost two decades.

Against this background, the political erosion of the ruling party, the coordination of the opposition and the economic crisis pushed Hungarian society towards a change of course, as expressed by the historic result obtained by Tisza in the April elections. It is in this new panorama where the Magyar government faces important challenges, although it also has a margin that would allow it to promote fundamental reforms on an institutional framework previously shaped by Fidesz.

Some of these challenges would involve recovering the independence of the Judiciary, adulterated and flawed by the outgoing government, and reviewing a Legislature already conditioned by distorted electoral rules. In particular, the opposition denounced unfair rules in the design of districts, that is, gerrymandering practices, at the same time that the system combined single-member candidacies with national lists, often pushing the electorate towards a strategic vote that ended up favoring the ruling party.

Furthermore, it is worth remembering that the setback not only had implications for an anti-republican and illiberal model internally, but also for the existence of a government close to the Kremlin and in constant tension with the entire European Union. The Russian influence, clearly visible in the positions of the ruling party, continued to represent a threat to the consolidation of a common foreign policy and greater cohesion among the member states of the European experiment.

For now, this result in Hungary implies an opposition rationality that managed to conglomerate behind Magyar's candidacy in Tisza, obtaining a historic result that reopens the possibility of constitutional changes and glimpses the hope of a republican return closer to a liberal democracy. Meanwhile, questions remain open regarding future confrontations between the powers of the State.

It is worth reflecting, consequently, on the strength of democracy and its institutions: is the European Union prepared to face internal actors contrary to its interests? It is essential to remember, in this instance, the role of Hungary under Orbán and its closeness to Vladimir Putin in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in open dissonance with the almost unanimous European position that perceives Russian interference in its democratic systems as a threat.

In a scenario in which, in addition, a kind of hybrid war is proposed between the Russian Federation and the European Union, and with democracies tending to be more susceptible to external interference than authoritarian regimes, it is also worth questioning the capacity of a republican and democratic system to sustain itself against illiberal leaderships. Given this, it is worth asking: is democracy capable of defending itself against demonstrations that threaten the liberal republican system itself?

Given that the current panorama in Europe reveals interference through financial support to political parties and different Eurosceptic actors contrary to the interests of the Union, it should be a preponderant issue to have an adequate defense policy in the face of new challenges that put the internal security and political stability in check, not only of the State in particular, but also of all the Member States of the European Union.

So much so that, while in the world the democratic quality is worrying, in the Hungarian case a scenario opens up that would make possible a gradual non-partisanship of the institutions, the return to civic freedoms and a policy closer to the national interests and of the European Union as a whole. At the same time, this leaves us with a warning about a great Western weakness: its porosity in the face of emerging populisms that, in the name of local nationalism, adopt illiberal and authoritarian agendas that burst into the different parliaments in the face of the crisis of traditional parties, emerging from a local demand, but also as forces that threaten unity and hinder institutional functioning.

In conclusion, this case leaves us a lesson in political maturity in a society and different parties that, in the face of their divergent agendas, prioritized unity over what is essential: the pragmatism of jointly rethinking a country where everyone can freely discuss their differences on equal terms and that once again prioritizes its partners against external authoritarianism that threatens its integrity.

Revista Conciencia Democrática

A voice for human dignity, liberal democracy and the republic

Independent publication · Buenos Aires · 2026